The general aim of this paper is to contribute to the discourse on the development of a system of international criminal justice. In so doing, this paper will pay attention to one aspect -rules of evidence -and examine its role in ensuring the rights to fair trial. The examination is limited to discussing offences relating to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the SCSL contained in Articles 2-5 of the SCSL Statute.
The general aim of this article is to contribute to the discourse on the development of a system of international criminal justice. Contemporary international law discourse has witnessed a shift: the question is no longer what is the basis for holding accountable those who breach international criminal law; it is how to ensure that the process through which accused persons are held accountable will be just, fair and expeditious. The focus of this paper is one such institutional mechanism: the ad hoc Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), in particular, its rules of evidence and how they assist in ensuring just, fair and expeditious trials for breaches of IHL and IHR during the Sierra Leone conflict which lasted between 1991 and 2002.
In the conclusion, I will attempt to ascertain whether the experience of applying rules of evidence at the SCSL helps to meet the objectives of a system of international criminal justice. These objectives include holding violators of IHR and IHL accountable; guaranteeing procedural proprietary; giving legitimacy to the process and bestowing confidence in international criminal justice institutions.
II. Origin of Rules of Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals
The right to fair trial is one of the cardinal features for which the IMT is renowned as having "…constituted a milestone in international criminal justice…" 2 For others, the IMT also impacted on the development of both substantive and procedural international criminal law. 3 The recent international criminal tribunals do not only incorporate the right to fair trial but also place at centre-stage the whole concept of international human rights protection and humanitarian law enforcement in their proceedings. In this context, the role the rules of evidence play in enhancing the integrity of such proceedings will also be discussed. Rules of evidence are discussed in order to contribute to giving prominence to this area of international criminal law, as international criminal tribunals (including ad hoc and hybrid tribunals) become a more permanent fixture of international law. The establishment of the ICC makes a compelling case for rules of evidence relating to international criminal trials to be standardized. The alternative would be continued reliance on the current approach adopted in the ad hoc and tribunals which appears to perpetuate what the International Law Commission refers to as fragmentation of international law. 4 The case-law that has developed from these tribunals (especially the ICTY and ICTR 5 ) relevant to evidence will be discussed.
The earliest available reference to rules of procedure and evidence at international criminal tribunals dates back to the IMT at Nuremberg. 6 The IMT thus represents an appropriate starting point to discuss rules of evidence in modern international criminal trials. That said, scholars have suggested that the rules of procedure and evidence of the IMT and other World War II trials conducted by the Occupying Powers "are not very instructive". 7 As such, it has been argued, those trials should not be relied upon as authoritative precedents for subsequent international criminal tribunals. Part of the rationale for this is that at the time of those trials, "the only recognized principle of international criminal law was the vaguely defined principle of the right to fair trial." The principle emphasized that the "…only obligation a sovereign State owes to the violator of one of its laws is to give him a fair trial in a forum where he may have counsel to represent him, where he may produce witnesses in his behalf and where he may speak in his own defence. Similarly, a defendant charged with a violation of International law is in no sense done an injustice if he is accorded the same rights and privileges." 5 The SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence were adopted mutatis mutandis from those of the ICTR. See Art. 14(1), SCSL Statute. 6 The historic trials have also been criticised for preventing the accused from bringing evidence concerning Allied misdeeds. It has also been argued that the tribunals had "sinister origins; that they were misused for political purposes; and that they were somewhat unfair." 10 In fact, one scholar has gone so far as to suggest that the "precedential value" of the IMT trials to the ICTY was minimal.
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Further, reliance on the IMT as a precedent on evidentiary matters is also debated in relation to the scope and depth of its rules of evidence. Perhaps this is the best way to address evidence at international criminal tribunals.
As countries practice different legal traditions, they have different preferences and approaches for proving criminal guilty and ensuring fairness. In common law countries, the process of proving criminal guilt is largely adversarial and party-led.
The judge presides over proceedings as an umpire and only intervenes to rule on procedure and law. Dissimilarly, in civil law jurisdictions, the process is inquisitorial in nature and provides for early judicial intervention with the judge at times examining, and cross or re-examining witnesses. Accordingly, in common law jurisdictions, the parties have, to a certain extent, a free hand in the choice and presentation of evidence while in civil law jurisdictions, an investigating judge has power to access any evidence without consideration of the parties' evidentiary preferences.
As the experience at the IMT demonstrated, the choice should not be either which requires proof of guilt "according to law".
However, it is the RPE of the tribunals which give us an indication of the standard of proof:
"…A finding of guilty may be reached only when a majority of the Trial
Chamber is satisfied that guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt." allegations include aggravating circumstances, these too must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
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The ICTY has noted that '"proof beyond reasonable doubt" should be understood as follows:
It need not reach certainty but it must carry a high degree of probability.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence, 'of course it is possible, but not in the least probable', the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.' 32 For Judge Richard May and Marieke Wierda, "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt means that the accused's guilt must be proven to a moral certainty".
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One notable exception to the reasonable doubt test occurs when the defence makes an allegation or when the prosecution's allegation is not an essential element of the charges in the indictment. In such circumstances, the burden of proof is based on a balance of probabilities. 34 Another exception to the reasonable doubt test relates to mitigation. Mitigating circumstances need only be proved on a "balance of probability." if it were or were not admitted. 40 When tribunals set out to determine the significance of the evidence of a case in relation to a fact in issue, consequence of a fact, a charge, or some other act to the required standard of proof, they engage in a "weighing" of the evidence. The determination of the weight of any evidence is a process that takes place beyond the admissibility stage. The SCSL has noted that a final determination of the relevance, reliability and probative value of evidence is made "at the appropriate time in light of all the evidence adduced during the trial". 41 On the face of it, evidence may be admitted, but that fact does not equate to the weight to be given to the propositions or statements contained in the evidence: "weight is still to be examined". 42 In other words, admissibility should not be confused with the weight that is attached to evidence. "[T]ribunals will often declare that evidence is admissible, but then declare it is of little weight."
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IV. General approach to admissibility of evidence at international criminal tribunals
43
Admissibility of evidence has not been concerned with only relevance (in the case of the SCSL) or relevance and probative value (in the case of the ICTY and ICTR), but rather may be concerned also with reliability. Generally, proof of 'reliability' is not required for evidence to be admitted. The international tribunals take the view "...that evidence which is both relevant and probative must also enjoy some component of reliability." 44 Evidence is reliable if it is relevant, has probative value and if there is a nexus between it and the subject matter. Accordingly, "reliability is the invisible golden thread which runs through all the components of admissibility."
This notwithstanding, the ICTR has maintained that "…reliability of evidence does not constitute a separate condition of admissibility; rather, it provides the basis for Kordic had ruled that Rule 89(C) gave broad discretion to admit the unsworn statement of a witness who passed away before he was cross-examined. The Trial
Chamber justified admitting and relying on that evidence to convict the accused partly because it was corroborated; the court noted the fact that the statement had not been subjected to cross-examination and was not made under oath were factors that went to the weight of the statement and not its admissibility. 46 However, the Appeals Chamber's view in Kordic was that the absence of indicia of reliability in the unsworn statement meant it was so lacking in reliability that it should have been excluded as without probative value under Rule 89(C).
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Admissibility of evidence at the SCSL -The case involving the Subpoena ad testificandum to the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone created opportunities and challenges for the SCSL to deal with the requirements of admissibility. For both majorities in the Trial and Appeals Chambers, 48 this case was primarily about Rule 54, the correct test for issuing subpoenas and the exercise of the Court's discretion therein. 49 Having relied on paragraphs 6-7 of the ICTY Halilovic Appeal Decision 50 and paragraphs 10-11 of the ICTY Krstic Appeal Decision, 51 the Trial Chamber ruled that the applicants had failed to meet the tests required for the court to exercise its discretion to issue a subpoena to the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone. 52 The
Trial Chamber came to this conclusion on the basis of two tests. The purpose or legitimate forensic purpose test requires that the "evidence must be of substantial or considerable assistance to the Accused in relation to a clearly identified issue that is relevant to the trial", while the necessity or last resort test requires the applicant to demonstrate whether the information sought is not obtainable through other means and whether it is necessary to ensure that the trial is informed and fair. 54 Subpoena Decision (Trial), paras 10 but at paras 34-48 the Trial Chamber debunks all of the above grounds upon which the Second Accused relied upon for the issuance of the subpoena and that with regards to (i) and (ii) above, the applicant failed to identify sufficient and specific indictment-related issues for which the President's evidence will be of material assistance to his (the Second Accused's) case. "Therefore, there is no legitimate forensic purpose in calling him to verify these facts", the Trial Chamber concludes at para 41. At para 48, the Second Accused is said to have failed to properly plead his case for simply following direct orders as opposed to having command responsibility and that his reliance on the President's testimony could not relieve him of liability as charged under the indictment. Hence, if anything, the President's evidence may be relevant in the determination of an appropriate sentence but not relevant for the purposes for which it is being sought at this stage. Regarding (iii) above, the Trial Chamber notes even though the applicant has shown indictmentrelated issues which the President's evidence would be of relevance, however, "[t]he Trial Chamber is not satisfied that a subpoena to President Kabbah was necessary on the basis that he could testify on the CDF command structure, where the information is obtainable through other means. Therefore, the Chamber declines to issue the subpoena on this basis", Subpoena Decision (Trial) para 55. The Although in a latter decision 66 the SCSL grants a subpoena application against Former President Kabbah, it is however argued that the importance of this decision as a precedent is limited or at the very least reveals inconsistent jurisprudence on the part of the SCSL in this area of procedure and law. The two decisions are different in their outcome; however, the Trial Chamber in the latter decision claims to have ruled in favour of granting the subpoena on the reasoning of the Subpoena Decision (Trial) in that the proposed testimony was likely to be of material assistance to the First Accused in this case. 67 The subpoena applicant in the RUF case also used more or less a similar argued but were not granted the subpoena sought.
V. Exclusion of evidence at the SCSL
'Best evidence Rule' -The SCSL Trial Chamber refused to admit an unsigned incriminating declaration 68 and letter of a defence witness. 69 The Trial Chamber took the view that the 'best evidence rule' requires the original declaration and letter to have been signed before being admitted into evidence. As Ms Fortune had travelled abroad after giving her evidence and unsigned letter, and as the declaration was not signed, the Trial Chamber concluded that "these important documents were unauthenticated and therefore unreliable". 70 The Declaration was eventually admitted after it had been signed by Mr. White. Hearsay evidence -There is no rule in international criminal law that is comparable to the common law "hearsay rule". In international criminal law, hearsay is a category of evidence and does not form part of the regime for excluding evidence.
From the historical tribunals to the SCSL, hearsay evidence 82 has been regarded as admissible. 83 The SCSL has ruled that under Rule 89(C) of the Rules, the judges have broad discretion to admit relevant hearsay evidence. 84 In an earlier decision the SCSL Chamber overturned the lower court's decision admitting unsworn testimony on the grounds that it lacked reliability and it should not have been relied upon to convict the accused.
86
In a 2005 SCSL decision, the Appeals Chamber employed the tests of admissibility in refusing to exclude hearsay evidence in spite of the defence contention that to admit such evidence "may lead to a violation of the 'right' to cross-examine the 'original sources'". 87 However, the court repeated its position "that admission of evidence is not indicative of a finding as to its probative value. …the probative value of hearsay evidence is something to be considered by the Trial Chamber at the end of the trial." 88 The Appeals Chamber upheld the decision to admit the hearsay evidence because the defence failed to show that admission would lead to "irreparable prejudice".
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As these tribunals have been set up, inter alia, to dispense justice through fair and expeditious trials, determining admissibility of hearsay evidence on the grounds of its relevance and probative value has been noted as the appropriate approach.
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Judges at International criminal tribunals are professionals; they are able to accord hearsay evidence its appropriate weight when deliberating its potential materiality in 86 the light of all the evidence before them. It is only when this is done that any disadvantage created by admitting hearsay can be remedied; otherwise, Bantekas and Nash argue that the right to cross-examine remains undermined.
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Documentary and expert evidence -The SCSL RPE, like its counterparts in the ICTY and ICTR, allow evidence to be adduced in written form or deposition in addition to or instead of oral testimony. 92 Examples of documentary evidence include official reports, maps, charts, and diagrams. In one SCSL case, during cross-examination, the prosecution sought to exhibit a chart, which purports to show the alleged command structure of the RUF, a contentious and disputed issue. 93 Ruling in favour of the accused persons, the Trial Chamber held that to admit the chart into evidence would amount to a violation of the prohibition against leading questions. 94 The Trial
Chamber explained that leading questions are prohibited in examination-in-chief and re-examination because they are wrong in law and in fact in the sense that the evidence produced therein "would be open to suspicion as being rather the prearranged version of the party than the spontaneous narration of the witness." 95 The decision also illustrates the principle that relevant documentary evidence is admitted into evidence only if neither party objects to its admission.
The SCSL has also had the opportunity to consider documentary evidence under Rules 54, 89 and 92bis of its RPE. 96 The Accused, Fofana, sought to have a written statement and an email print-out admitted into evidence under Rule 92bis without calling the witnesses to testify and be subject to cross-examination. Since the prosecution did not object to the email documentary evidence, and the evidence contained factual assertions relevant and susceptible of corroboration, the written statement and email print-out were admitted into evidence. In the historic trials, documentary evidence in the form of war plans and written orders were said to be the "most compelling witnesses against those who drafted, signed, initiated or distributed" them. 100 The An affidavit. or sworn declaration is another form of documentary evidence. It is often admitted into evidence if the other party does not object and it must be in the interest of justice to admit such evidence. In the event of an objection, the affidavit witness will be required to give oral testimony.
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A witness who gives opinion evidence on a subject other than the facts in issue is an expert witness. An expert witness must possess the requisite qualification to be able to express a valid opinion and must be impartial. His/her opinion should "enlighten the Judges on specific issues of a technical nature, requiring special knowledge in a specific field" 106 and such evidence is aimed at assisting the court in its deliberation. 107 In the AFRC case, six expert witnesses were called upon to explain to the Trial Chamber the practice of 'force marriages' or 'bush wives'. Three expert witnesses for the prosecution and two for the defence had their testimonies crossexamined and their reports admitted into evidence under Rule 94bis. The report of the third expert witness for the defence was admitted into evidence without crossexamination. 108 Rule 94bis is the principal provision which governs expert evidence and to a large extent, deals with procedural more than evidentiary matter. In the AFRC Judgment, the SCSL was called upon to rule that 'forced marriages' qualify as 'Other Inhumane Acts' punishable under Article 2(i) of the Statute. 116 This is important as for "…the first time in international legal history, 'forced marriage' is being prosecuted as a 'crime against humanity' in Sierra Leone's post-conflict 'Special Court'". 117 Ruling on the evidence and the burden of proof to be discharged for a successful conviction, the Trial Chamber noted as follows: However, if the latter applies, this would be the correct approach as any evidence, including corroborating evidence, must be relevant, probative and reliable.
Inconsistent and conflicting testimony will not meet these requirements and admitting such evidence will lend itself to miscarriages of justice and violations of the right to fair trial.
One of the aims of this article was to find out whether or how the experience of applying the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the SCSL helped to meet the objectives of the international criminal justice system. These objectives include holding violators of IHR and IHL accountable; guaranteeing procedural proprietary;
giving legitimacy to the process; and bestowing confidence in the international criminal justice institutions themselves. The concluding paragraphs will now address this aspect.
VI. Conclusion
It is difficult to make a generalised statement as to whether the SCSL has, on the whole, achieved all the objectives this paper set out to examine. Only a handful of cases were discussed. However, from this limited study, it is clear that the decisions of the SCSL relating to the application of its rules of evidence lend the court a degree of credibility in its contribution to the development of evidence in international criminal trials.
The view taken in this article is that the SCSL Subpoena Decision (Trial) was wrong. It CDF case as well as the victims, the opportunity to know whether President Kabbah's testimony had any relevance to Fofana's and Norman's guilt or innocence. The decision therefore illustrates the kind of weak jurisprudence from the SCSL in this area.
The decision in Prosecutor v. Norman et al could be considered a positive contribution to the rules of evidence in international criminal tribunals. 123 The appeal decision makes the point that Rule 89(C) does not require statements or submissions to be signed to be admissible. The Rule is designed to avoid sterile legal debate over admissibility so the court can concentrate on the pragmatic issues. The SCSL decision in favour of excluding confession evidence obtained involuntarily is welcomed on the ground that it helps to clarify the standard of proof required in criminal trials. 128 Proof beyond reasonable doubt appears to be a high threshold that may be difficult to reach within the context of international criminal trials for IHL and IHL. This view is supported by Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash and DD Ntanda Nsereko. 129 Further, William A Schabas holds a similar view: "Generally, it should be presumed that the balance of probabilities standard applies to issues of evidence other than the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, unless there is some special provision." 130 If a party seeking to exclude confession evidence on the grounds that it was obtained involuntarily is regarded as making a fresh allegation, then the general principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. In the Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon, Gbao 131 case, there is no doubt that the confession evidence is incriminating and bears directly on the guilt or innocence of the First Accused. Besides, the application to admit the confession evidence was made by the prosecution. Hence, it is suggested that the SCSL adopted the correct standard of proof.
Accordingly, it is argued that the SCSL approach in Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon, Gbao, 132 in which the alleged confessional statements relate to the guilt or innocence of the First Accused, appropriately required the prosecution to prove their claim beyond reasonable doubt. This is a positive contribution to the law of evidence in international criminal trials relating to confessions.
In relation to hearsay evidence, the SCSL decisions discussed in this paper depart from settled practice. In its consideration of hearsay evidence, the SCSL demonstrated that it was mindful of the impact admissibility of hearsay evidence would have on the right to fair trial and the administration of justice. Incriminating hearsay evidence relating to command responsibility was ruled inadmissible on grounds of unreliability.
133
Moreover, even when serious allegations have been made against the accused, the SCSL has not simply endorsed such allegations, as one would expect in a show trial.
For example, the SCSL refused to admit unreliable hearsay evidence relating to the rape of young girls and catholic nuns. 134 On another occasion, the SCSL ruled as follows:
"The Trial Chamber finds that the hearsay evidence of witness TF1-153 that women and girls were raped at PWD and the general evidence of witness TF1-334 that young girls were abducted and brought to PWD is insufficient to satisfy the actus reus and mens rea elements of rape." 
